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Abstract 
 
 
 
Recent changes made to the UK Corporate Governance Code require UK firms to 
report new or enhanced narrative information concerning their principal risks, their 
risk management processes and their future viability. This paper analyses whether the 
level and nature of voluntary compliance with these new requirements is consistent 
with alternative economic and political visibility incentives. We analyse relevant 
sections of financial reports produced by industry matched samples of large-, mid- 
and small-cap UK listed firms during the transitional 2013-14 financial reporting 
years. Both specific and generic readability attributes of the reports are measured. We 
find that virtually no firm in our sample has provided any viability statement. 
Empirical analysis of disclosures concerning principal risk assessment and review 
processes appear to be primarily motivated by political visibility reasons. Examples of 
particularly good and cases of poor corporate risk reporting practices are also 
discussed. Possible implications for the actuarial profession are discussed. 
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1.	Introduction	
 
The purpose of this paper is to: 
 summarise how recent changes made to FRC reporting regulations are likely to 
impact corporate risk identification, measurement, evaluation and monitoring 
practices,  and provide assurance to stakeholders concerning future viability 
 review the relevant literature concerning firm disclosures of risk information 
that may bear on the topic   
 provide archival evidence of how risk reporting practices by a sample of UK 
listed firms during the transitional period have been impacted by key relevant 
provisions of the revised code provisions, and consider how these practices have 
been evolving 
 provide examples of best practices by firms in complying with the FRC 
Corporate Codes in the period immediately prior to their mandatory 
implementation 
 
We believe these topics are important because the changes in FRC reporting 
requirements will have a significant impact upon many companies and will in many 
cases need enhancements to risk management processes. This is of interest to the 
actuarial profession because many of the changes focus on the modelling and 
quantification of risks – areas where actuaries have significant experience and could 
potentially provide assistance to companies outside the financial services sector.1 
 
We have approached this research through both quantitative and qualitative analysis 
of a sample of corporate report and accounts covering a wide spectrum of company 
                                                 
1 The research undertaken seeks to address a number of issues raised in an initial sessional event held 
on 24 November 2014, as summarised in British Actuarial Journal (20:3): 456‐460.  
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sizes. Our focus throughout this report is on reporting within published annual report 
and accounts. We recognise that some companies will provide additional reporting of 
risks by means other than their annual report but this is out of the scope of our 
analysis. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides details of the 
recent developments in the UK Corporate Governance Code. Section 3 provides a 
literature review. Section 4 outlines the research methodology. Section 5 discusses the 
results of empirical tests concerning the association of trends in levels and changes of 
risk disclosure quality and various firm characteristics. Section 6 evaluates case 
studies of best practice disclosures. Section 7 provides a conclusion. Section 8 
discusses the potential implications for actuaries. 
 
2.		Background	
The UK Corporate Governance Code and associated Guidance (commonly referred to 
as the “Turnbull Guidance”) which are issued by the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) have long set expectations for UK listed companies with regard to the 
management and reporting of risks. The UK Corporate Governance Code has been 
updated numerous times with the previous version of the code issued in 2012. The 
Turnbull Guidance was first issued in 1999 and was subsequently updated in 2005. 
 
The most recent work to update the Code and Guidance commenced with the 
Sharman Inquiry in 2011 which focussed on post financial crisis going concern 
disclosures. After an extended period of consultation a revised version of the UK 
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Corporate Governance Code was issued in September 2014 together with a 
replacement for the previous Turnbull Guidance entitled “Guidance on Risk 
Management, Internal Control and Related Financial and Business Reporting”. 
 
The changes were effective for financial years commencing on or after 1 October 
2014. For companies with a calendar financial year this means that the report and 
account covering the 2015 financial year will be the first for which the new Code and 
Guidelines are a requirement. The analysis in this paper focuses on 2013 and 2014 
report and accounts. The report and accounts covering the 2013 financial year will 
typically have been issued in the first half of 2014 before the new Code and 
Guidelines were published. The report and accounts covering the 2014 financial year 
will typically have been issued in the first half of 2015 after the new Code and 
Guidelines had been published but before they became a requirement. These accounts 
therefore presented an opportunity for firms to voluntarily early adopt all or some of 
the new requirements. 
 
With regard to the UK Corporate Governance Code the main changes impacting risk 
management processes and disclosures are set out below. 
 
The Code sets out a number of Main Principles under which sit specific code 
provisions. 
 
There has been only a very minor change to the Main Principle relating to Risk 
Management and Internal Control with the term “significant risks” being replaced by 
“principal risks” and the text now reading as follows:   
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The board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the 
principal risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The 
board should maintain sound risk management and internal control systems.  
There are now three Code Provisions within this section of the Code where previously 
there was just one. The three provisions are as follows: 
C.2.1. The directors should confirm in the annual report that they have 
carried out a robust assessment of the principal risks facing the company, 
including those that would threaten its business model, future performance, 
solvency or liquidity. The directors should describe those risks and explain 
how they are being managed or mitigated.  
C.2.2.  Taking account of the company’s current position and principal risks, 
the directors should explain in the annual report how they have assessed the 
prospects of the company, over what period they have done so and why they 
consider that period to be appropriate. The directors should state whether 
they have a reasonable expectation that the company will be able to continue 
in operation and meet its liabilities as they fall due over the period of their 
assessment, drawing attention to any qualifications or assumptions as 
necessary.  
C.2.3. The board should monitor the company’s risk management and internal 
control systems and, at least annually, carry out a review of their effectiveness, 
and report on that review in the annual report. The monitoring and review 
should cover all material controls, including financial, operational and 
compliance controls.  
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The first two of these provisions are new. The third is very similar to the previous 
code provision. C.2.1 adds a requirement to describe the principal risks and how they 
are being managed or mitigated. The description of principal risks was already a 
requirement of the Companies Act 2006 but was not previously referred to within the 
Code. C.2.2 introduces forward looking statements about the ongoing viability of the 
firm.  
In this revision of the Code the FRC also enhanced the provision relating to going 
concern assessment. The provision now reads as follows: 
C.1.3. In annual and half-yearly financial statements, the directors should 
state whether they considered it appropriate to comply with the going concern 
basis of accounting in preparing them, and identify any material uncertainties 
to the company’s ability to continue to do so over a period of at least twelve 
months from the date of approval of the financial statements.  
As noted earlier the updated “Turnbull” Guidance was issued in September 2014 with 
the title “Guidance on Risk Management, Internal Control and Related Financial and 
Business Reporting”. This was a significant revision to previous guidance reflecting 
the changes to the Code, the recommendations of the Sharman Inquiry and generally 
enhanced expectations regarding risk management best practice. 
It isn’t the role of this paper to provide a comprehensive summary of the revised 
guidance but we highlight paragraph 50 of the Guidance which states: 
The descriptions of the principal risks and uncertainties should be sufficiently 
specific that a shareholder can understand why they are important to the 
company. The report might include a description of the likelihood of the risk, 
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an indication of the circumstances under which the risk might be most relevant 
to the company and its possible impacts. Significant changes in principal risks 
such as a change in the likelihood or possible impact, or the inclusion of new 
risks, should be highlighted and explained. A high-level explanation of how 
the principal risks and uncertainties are being managed or mitigated should 
also be included.  
Overall the revised guidance materially increases the expectations for risk 
management processes within firms. In a report by the Institute and Faculty of 
Actuaries (REF1) it was concluded: 
The current guidance and the current processes in many firms are based on a 
traditional, control- focussed approach to risk management. However, the new 
guidance is asking firms to embrace a much more advanced, enterprise-wide 
risk management process that encompasses many advanced elements such as 
a focus on culture, decision making and sophisticated quantification and 
modelling of risks.  
 
In conclusion, the new Corporate Code, effective for reporting periods ending after 
30/9/15, requires that UK company annual reports must now incorporate a new 
“strategic report” element that must include specific statements concerning the 
following elements:  
* A “robust assessment” about their principal risks (C2.1) 
* The company management’s expectations about the future prospects of the 
company (C2.2), and 
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* A review of the effectiveness of risk management procedures and monitoring 
policies (C2.3).  
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3.	Literature	Review	
 
 
 
This section briefly outlines and reviews prior research related to voluntary risk 
reporting practices by firms. Both theoretical perspectives and empirical literature is 
reviewed, although the analysis is restricted to that applicable to this report and hence 
is not intended to be a comprehensive or exhaustive review of the literature in general. 
The focus is mainly restricted to reporting practices by UK listed corporations during 
the most recent relevant study period of 2008 onwards. 
 
3.1. Theoretical perspectives 
In general, there are two alternative theoretical explanations in the relevant literature 
that motivate rationales for why firms may choose to voluntarily report risk 
information to their stakeholders.2  Standard economic models such as Verrecchia 
(1983), Dye (1985) and Dontoh (1989) predict that corporate managers with “good 
news” will voluntarily release the information whenever the perceived benefits (e.g. 
higher stock market value for the firm) exceeds the costs associated with disclosure 
(such as “proprietary costs” related to public revelation of private corporate 
information).  
 
An alternative justification for firms to voluntarily disclose (risk) information relates 
to more instrumental demands from society generally for greater “political visibility”. 
Firms that are particularly sensitive to political interference (e.g. larger firms) face 
greater incentives to disclose information. Studies have typically focused on 
                                                 
2 Although these theories do not specifically concern the disclosure of “risk”  information, they often 
focus  their  attention on  forward  looking disclosures of  the  type  envisaged by C2.1 of  the Revised 
code, such as “management forecasts of future earnings potential”. 
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disclosure incentives facing firms in relatively regulated industries, such as public 
authorities or regulated banks (e.g. Lim and McKinnon, 1993).3 
  
The above theoretical perspectives assume that the shareholder is the dominant 
stakeholder that corporate managers face in exercising discretion over the nature and 
quality of risk disclosures. However a broader “complexity” perspective on such 
practices emphasises instead the enhanced roles of “gatekeepers” such as regulators 
and professional bodies and consultants to prevent corporate wrongdoing. In 
particular the increased emphasis in the revised code on “future viability”, “principal 
risk exposure” and “assessment of risk management systems” places a potentially 
greater role on professionals such as auditors, regulators and other professionals to 
monitor and verify the reliability of corporate (risk) information. 
Based on this alternative perspective, the new requirements could be viewed as 
increasing the relative importance of various private gatekeepers, such as accountants, 
who are traditionally viewed as the most prominent group of gatekeepers of corporate 
governance and compliance with securities law (e.g. Coffee, 2006).  On the other 
hand, the new requirements also increase the relative power of more specialist risk 
professionals, such as IFOA, IRM and/or CERA qualified individual employees, 
consultants etc. that are presumably more qualified to provide advice and assurance 
services to corporations that are subject to the new requirements. Goergen (2010, 63), 
in reviewing the outcome of the financial crisis (but before the new Corporate Codes 
were implemented) suggests that enhanced shareholder monitoring will likely entail 
changes to the dynamics in the complex social ecosystem of shareholders, employees, 
                                                 
3 We recognise there are also more “critical theory” potential explanations for why firms might face 
incentives  to  voluntarily  disclose  (risk)  information  such  as  those  related  to  legitimacy  and 
institutional  theories  (e.g. Gray et al.,  (1995)  and Trediga et  al.  (2012)), however we have  ignored 
these based on the assumption that UK firms must adhere to the “comply or explain” requirements of 
the Corporate Governance Code. 
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stakeholders and gatekeepers that surround the corporation. Consequently it could be 
that observed “voluntary compliance” with the revised code requirements is less to do 
with increasing shareholder accountability, but instead is more related to efforts by 
corporations to realign these complex gatekeeper inter-relationships in fulfilling their 
broader accountability to society as a whole.  
 
3.2. Empirical evidence 
There is a large and growing literature on risk reporting, but it is generally unfocused 
and does not provide unequivocal evidence in favour of either the theoretical 
perspectives outlined above. ICAEW (2011) summarises the general state of research 
in risk reporting by concluding that researchers found that disclosure requirements 
had limited effect, while research findings are mixed. 
While there is some evidence that both quantitative and qualitative risk reporting may 
have been useful, there is also evidence that qualitative risk reporting is not 
considered useful by some users of corporate reporting. Indeed, users appear to have 
conflicting views on risk reporting – some finding it useful, some not (ICAEW, 2011, 
15).  
Subsequently, Abraham and Shrives (2014) developed a generic model for assessing 
the quality of risk factor disclosures, and apply it to evaluate the quality of risk 
reporting by four companies in the food production and processing sector. Their 
results suggest that company managers prefer providing disclosures that are symbolic 
rather than substantive. They suggest that improving the quality of reporting could be 
maintained within a properly monitored ‘comply or explain’ approach, which is 
consistent with the FRC’s latest approach in revising the Code. By contrast, in the 
United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has since 2005 
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mandated firms to include a “risk factor” section in their Form 10-K (Annual Report) 
filings. Campbell et al. (2014) find that US firms that face greater risk tend to disclose 
more risk factors, and that the type of risks disclosed are affected by the types of risk 
faced by the firm (i.e. financial, tax, legal, other-systematic and other-
idiosyncratic). They conclude that the SEC’s decision to mandate risk factor 
disclosures is vindicated, since firm disclosures are firm-specific and useful to 
investors. 
 
There are also relatively few studies that investigate incentives and disincentives for 
risk reporting practices in the insurance industry, where actuaries might expect to play 
a key role in providing reporting narrative to stakeholders concerning corporate 
policies on risk management, and future expectations. The first IFOA risk reporting 
working party (Klumpes et al., 2014) examined practices in risk reporting by global 
insurance companies.  They examine various arguments for and against risk reporting, 
whether voluntary or compliance in nature.  An important issue is whether reporting is 
dominated by shareholder, regulatory or managerial incentives.  They evaluated 
whether current reporting practices were consistent with political visibility, cultural 
effects, or idiosyncratic managerial incentives.  Their empirical analysis is based on (1) 
a content analysis of disclosures contained in annual reports of a sample of European, 
Asian and US global top 25 insurers between 2006 and 2012 and (2) a survey of 
internal business reporting practices. 
   
Klumpes et al. (2014) re-characterise a disclosure index from prior research to 
examine the relationship between the extent of risk disclosure and various managerial, 
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agency and other characteristics.  They predict and find that the extent and nature of 
risk disclosures depends on cultural imperatives and managerial incentives.  
 
In the closely related banking context, Ahmed and Khalid (2013) examine the impact 
of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of operational risk disclosures 
provided in the annual reports and risk reports in a representative sample of 63 
publicly listed European banks for the fiscal years 2008 and 2009. They find that 
banks having a higher proportion of outside board directors are associated with higher 
operational risk disclosure quality. Their results corroborate the findings of previous 
studies and confirm the positive impact of effective corporate governance 
mechanisms on disclosure quality in public firms and the importance of considering 
the effects of the legal setting in which various disclosure practices take place.  
In the non-financial sector, Lindsey and Shrives (2006) explore risk disclosures within 
a sample of 79 UK company annual reports using content analysis. A significantly 
positive association is found between the number of risk disclosures and company 
size. Similarly, a significant association is found between the number of risk 
disclosures and level of environmental risk. However they make no effort to delineate 
disclosure “quality” from accounting “quantity”-driven factors that might be 
associated with the frequency of risk disclosures. 
 
Khaled et al. (2016) address this issue by measuring each information quality attribute 
and then aggregate these measures in a single disclosure quality score.4 Further tests 
show that their measure is reliable and valid. They also find that disclosure quantity is 
                                                 
4 The FOG disclosure score used by Khaled et al. (2016) is also employed in this study , which is 
discussed in section 4.2 below. 
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not a good proxy for disclosure quality. In addition, it shows that the determinants of 
disclosure quality and disclosure quantity differ. However, their study was focused on 
the more generic issue of “reporting quality” rather than focusing on risk reporting. 
Further their analysis was premised on assuming that the qualitative characteristics of 
financial reporting information, as specified in the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR) (2006), is also a valid basis for  assessing 
information quality.  
 
3.3. Summary and Critique 
The revisions to the Corporate Code provide considerable challenges to UK firms to 
significantly extend both the nature and the scope of their existing annual reporting 
practices.  However, given the relative novelty of the changes, it should not be 
surprising that there is, at time of writing, very little substantive evidence available in 
the existing literature that could help guide firms in effectively implementing these 
requirements. 5  Further, the FRC’s principle based approach has left considerable 
discretion as to how firms can implement changes to their reporting. 
 
While the more relevant empirical literature has continued to evolve and clarify 
methodological issues since the ICAEW (2011) review, there remains a lack of any 
clear evidence supporting the implications of either standard economic or political 
visibility arguments as to why firms might voluntarily disclose risk information. 
Moreover, we consider that Khalid et all’s (2016) disclosure method is likely to be 
less relevant to evaluate the readability of strategic risk reporting narrative disclosures 
                                                 
5 This comment  refers  to  the highly  topical nature of  this area, since  risk  reporting practices by UK 
companies are also regularly being reviewed by accounting  firms as part of  their regular surveys of 
annual reporting practices. For example, PwC’s (2016) survey of “Strategic Reporting in the FTSE 350” 
found that “companies generally have some way to go to put the necessary building blocks  in place 
for the 2014 Code”. 
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made  by firms in compliance with the key disclosure aspects of the newly Revised 
Code. 
 
There are still considerable gaps in our understanding of risk reporting practices and 
the extent to which they comply with the new provisions of the Corporate Code. 
Moreover, the result of the existing studies outlined above are equivocal as to the 
influences affecting disclosure and appear to be plagued by the failure to delineate 
mandatory (e.g. mandated financial statement footnotes that need to comply with 
relevant accounting standards), voluntary and/or principle-based “comply or explain” 
based risk managerial-level strategic disclosures to which the revised governance 
code relevant provisions apply.  
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4.	Research	Methodology	
 
This section briefly outlines the sample selection procedures, and how the various 
indices used for measuring various aspects of risk management communication, and 
defines and describes the major firm characteristics that prior research suggests is 
associated with corporate managerial incentives to comply with risk reporting 
practices. 
 
4.1 Sample selection procedure 
The final sample is based on the industry match paired sample of firms in three, 
equally sized large cap (FTSE 100), mid-cap (FTSE 250) and small cap (FTSE All 
share), and stratified across twenty key industries. The choice of industry sectors is 
partly driven by the FTSE industry sector classification system and the desire for 
capturing sufficient richness in diversity in disclosure quality across regulated, 
financial and industrial sectors. 
 
Firms selected for inclusion in the sample were initially based on a random selection 
procedure, and were then subject to the following additional selection criteria (i) have 
complete, relevant financial and statistical data over the study period 2012-2014; (ii) 
provide full information in their website and/or other sources to enable annual reports 
to be obtained for research purposes; and (iii) are not subject to major restructuring, 
M&A or corporate governance structure changes over this period. These final 
selection criteria limited the number of total sample firms to 60, comprising 20 from 
each large, mid and small cap indices.  
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The three year sample period 2013-2015 is considered to be most appropriate to this 
study for a number of reasons. First, the UK Companies Act requires UK firms for 
reporting period on or after 30 September 2013 to provide a strategic report. Second, 
the subsequent financial reporting year 2014 provides an opportunity for firms to 
voluntarily comply with the Corporate Code changes that were issued in September 
2014. Third, analysing reports in the financial year immediately preceding the 
mandatory implementation date (i.e. for financial reporting years ending before 1 
October 2015) permits us to draw inferences about the incentives facing firms to 
comply early with the relevant Corporate Code risk management and strategic 
disclosure requirements. Finally the period also coincides with industry-specific risk 
reporting developments, such as the BSBC 30390 (banking), Pillar III reporting 
requirements under Solvency II (insurance) and other industry sector sustainability 
reporting requirements (under international reporting guidelines and ISO requirements 
for sustainability and/or integrated reporting). 
 
The final sample of 60 companies is listed in Table 1, below. 
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Table 1 
Sample of Large, Mid and Small CAP firms 
 
Industry Large CAP 
(FTSE100) 
Mid CAP 
(FTSE 250) 
Small CAP 
(FTSE All 
Share) 
Insurance Aviva Hiscox Novae 
Life insurance Prudential Phoenix Chesnara 
Banking HSBC TSB OneSavingsBank
Software and support Sage Fidessa SDL 
Retail Tesco WH Smith Topps Tiles 
Travel and leisure Easyjet Rank Flybe 
Mining RioTinto Vedanta Kenmare 
Resources 
Personal goods Unilever Ted Baker Brammer 
Oil and gas BP Premier Oil Salamander 
Energy 
Pharmaceutical GSK Genus Skyepharma 
Transport Royal Mail BBA Aviation Braemar 
Shipping 
Beverages Diageo Britvic Carrs Milling 
Aerospace defence BAE Cobham Chemring 
Automotive GKN Oxford 
Instruments 
TT Electronics 
Communications BT TalkTalk Kcom 
Utilities Severn Trent Pennon Carclo  
General industrial Smiths Rexam British 
Polythene 
Industrial engineering IMI Bodycote Renold 
Media WPP Rightmove Johnston Press 
Construction CRH Balfour Beatty Boot (Henry) 
	
 
The large CAP firms are typically listed on multiple exchanges and have international 
operations. By contrast most mid-CAP firms are leaders in the UK industries in which 
they operate but tend to have some international exposure. The small CAP firms are 
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mostly well known national companies but have significantly smaller scale 
investment and operating activities than the more international-focused, larger firms.6    
 
4.2 Construction of Disclosure Indices 
Chen et al. (2015) distinguish between various types of disclosure indices that can be 
used to proxy existing measures of “overall disclosure quality”. These include 
voluntary disclosure measures such as management forecasts and conference calls, or 
researcher self-constructed indices (e.g., Botosan 1997; Francis et al., 2008), or 
analyst ratings such as the now-discontinued AIMR scores, or the narrative quality of 
management discussion (e.g. Strategic Report) contained in annual reports, such as 
the Fog Index (Li, 2008).7  
 
In this study, we use two of these main types of disclosure indices in order to analyse 
the quality of disclosures in the narrative text component of UK company annual 
reports.8 We first use a generic (FOG) index to analyze the overall general readability 
of “risk narrative” elements of both the management strategy and risk management 
narrative sections of UK company annual reports, in line with prior literature.9 The 
FOG complete formula is: 
                                                 
6 Two of the firms included in the original sample subsequently were merged with other companies 
(TSB Bank) 
7 Li (2008) considers that the FOG score (discussed below) as the most authoritative "proxy" for 
"reporting quality" and is generally and universally accepted as the most appropriate measure of 
readability of annual reports.. 
8 Our decision to focus our analysis on the assumption that UK companies may elect, under the 
Revised code, to place their risk and viability disclosures in the narrative, “Strategic Report” element of 
their annual report. Such disclosures enable company directors to be covered by “safe harbour” 
provisions in the Companies Act 2006 (i.e. provided that directors do not make a deliberately or 
recklessly untrue or misleading statement or dishonestly conceal a material fact by way of an omission, 
they will not be liable to compensate the company for any loss incurred by it in reliance on the report).  
9The Gunning fog index measures the readability of English writing. The index estimates the years of 
formal education needed to understand the text on a first reading. index is calculated with the following 
algorithm: (i) Select a passage (such as one or more full paragraphs) of around 100 words. Do not omit 
any sentences; (ii) Determine the average sentence length, by dividing the number of words by the 
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obtained from Lancaster University Management School (LUMS) and provides a 
readability score for the relevant sections labelled either “strategy report” and “risk 
policies”. These provide us with an initial comprehension of the nature and extent of 
compliance with both the “viability” and “review and monitoring of procedures” 
elements of the revised code.  
 
However this generic type of readability index is unlikely to be sufficient to evaluate 
readability of corporate reports concerning more specific requirements of the revised 
code, such as disclosure of information about the effectiveness of the assessment of 
principal risks. We therefore further develop three “researcher self-constructed” 
disclosure indices.10   These are based on the three “stages” of risk assessment as 
identified in Figure 3 of the ISO 31000/2009 standard:11 
I. Risk identification stage: this index examines disclosures concerning the 
various types of risk exposure which appear to be most applicable for use by 
actuarial professionals, particularly in the context of financial services, as 
                                                                                                                                            
number of sentences.); (iii) Count the "complex" words: those with three or more syllables; (iv) Add 
the average sentence length and the percentage of complex words; and (v) Multiply the result by 0.4. A 
fog index of 12 requires the reading level of a U.S. high school senior (around 18 years old).. 
10  Our procedure differs from that used in Klumpes et al. (2014). They focused instead on the 
shareholder, regulatory and managerial incentive aspects of risk disclosure practices in the global 
insurance industry. 
11 Referring to our earlier discussion in Section 2, above it should be noted that, whereas Stages I and 
II above appear to relate to discrete phases of the new “assessment of principal risks” reporting 
requirement of the revised coderevised code (C2.1), Stage III approximates the separate revised 
coderevised code requirement (C2.3) to “report on the review of the effectiveness of….the company’s 
risk management and internal control systems”. 
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developed by Kelliher et al. (2013) – i.e. market, credit, insurance & 
demographic, liquidity, operational, strategic, and frictional and aggregation.12 
II. Risk measurement and evaluation  stage: this index seeks to assess what risk 
measurement approaches were used for overall ERM and control processes, 
the risk analysis of market, credit, liquidity and operational and non-
quantifiable risks. It is composed of various categories of standard processes 
and measurement systems that are used to assure that the firm complies with 
the relevant internal and externally validated risk evaluation requirements. 
These typically comply with robustness and prudence objectives as specified 
by Solvency II, Pillar 3 type disclosures – such as definition and description of 
limits and escalation processes, risk mitigation activities, variability at 
specified confidence intervals and stress tests.13 
III. Risk monitoring and control stage: this covers various components of 
management control and monitoring processes to assure the quality of risk 
evaluation and identification techniques considered in Stages I and II above. 
They include the adoption and retention of high-level managerial (e.g. 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)) and control processes, risk appetite, risk 
culture, emerging risks, risk controls, risk assurance, incentives board 
monitoring, lines of defence and whistleblowing.   
 
                                                 
12 This classification system should be distinguished from “top down” standard classification systems, 
such as the Basel framework, which focuses attention mostly on financial risk, to the exclusion of 
“softer” risks related to strategy and frictional costs, which we consider to be more appropriate to 
analysing discussions about risk that are subject to the Revised Code as contained in the “Strategic 
Report” section of UK company annual reports. 
13 Pillar 3 of Solvency II contains requirements concerning disclosure and transparency, and is yet to be 
fully implemented, due partly to delays caused by the phased in implementation of  equivalent 
accounting standard IFRS 4, phase II reporting standards. 
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Each of the above disclosure indices were constructed based on a maximum of 100 
“points” possible for each of the major components outlined above and are 
summarised in table 2.14 All components were equally weighted except for Stage I, 
which was based on the weighting system explained further in Klumpes et al. (2014). 
These are the principle Basel based risk categories (financial, operational) as well as 
strategic, frictional and aggregate risks.  
  
                                                 
14 To avoid confusion between risk classes (Stage I), categories of risk measurement and evaluation 
systems and processes (Stage II) and types of strategic level monitoring and control procedures (Stage 
III) the generic term “component” is herein used throughout this paper when discussing the sub‐
categories of disclosure risk for each of these stages. 
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Table 2 
Decomposition of Risk management indices 
 
Nr. Stage I 
Risk identification 
Stage II 
Risk measurement 
Stage III 
Risk monitoring 
1 Market (13.5%) ERM & control process ERM & control process 
2 Credit (18.2%) Risk analysis: market Risk appetite 
3 Business (31.8%) Risk analysis: credit Risk culture 
4 Liquidity (9.1%) Risk analysis: liquidity Emerging risks 
5 Operation (11.4%) Risk analysis: operation Risk controls 
6 Strategy (6.8%) Risk evaluation: market Risk assurance 
7 Frictional (4.6%) Risk evaluation: credit Incentives 
8 Aggregate (4.6%) Risk evaluation: liquidity risk Board monitoring 
9 - Risk evaluation: operation Three lines of defence 
10 - Risk evaluation: unquantified Whistle blowing 
 
Scope of analysis. Annual reports that are available on the website of each of the 
sample companies identified in table 1 were then analysed for 2013 and 2014, 
separately.. A keyword search was then conducted to identify each of the component 
items summarised in table 2,, with a score of 1 if fully disclosed (based on a 
subjective judgment about the frequency of key word occurrence, in this case judged 
to be at least six separate disclosures), 0.5 if partly disclosed (between 1 to 5 
disclosure instances) and 0 otherwise. This process was repeated for each company 
annual report and for each major component of the three stages, as summarised in 
table 2. This resulted in a total score out of 45 points, which was recalculated to a 
score out of 100 points to ensure consistency with the disclosure indices outlined 
below. 
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics - Company financial and market characteristics 
In order to analyse the determinants of disclosure quality (discussed in the next 
section), various financial characteristics were collected for the sample companies for 
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the three years ended 2013 from Compustat.15 If the “economic” perspective on why 
firms choose to adopt the Revised code requirements early holds, then we would 
expect that liquidity, growth, profitability and future prospects (proxies by book to 
market) would be significantly and positively associated with both our generic (i.e. 
Fog index) and bespoke (3 stages) disclosure measures. On the other hand, if the 
alternative “political visibility” perspective holds, then the cross-sectional variation in 
these disclosure measures across the sample is more likely to be explained by factors 
such as firm size and growth.  
 
Since the future viability statement is closely connected with management 
expectations about the future, it was considered appropriate to evaluate the quality of 
reporting practices by reference to the ratio of current value to market participants’ 
best estimate of future value (i.e. the “book to market” ratio), as well as total firm risk. 
Relevant capital market data was also collected book to market, standard deviation  
daily stock returns). This enabled us to calculate the total risk for each company, 
defined as the daily standard deviation of stock price. All data is calculated for the 
three financial years ending 2013 (Growth) or as at the 2013 reporting year date 
(Size). Table 3 defines each of the financial and market variables used to analyse 
cross-sectional variations in disclosure quality, and also summarises descriptive 
statistics for each of the three sub-samples of companies.16 
	 	
                                                 
15In order to facilitate meaningful multivariate tests (outlined in section 5.1 below), the financial and 
capital market data variables defined and described in Table 3 were subject to a “winsorisation 
procedure” to eliminate extreme outliier observations (5‐10%). 
16 While Table 3 shows the total market capitalisation (in £m) as of the 2013 firm financial reporting 
year date. However as explained in section 5.1 below, for the purpose of conducting empirical tests, 
this is replaced with the natural log of total assets, consistent with that used by prior studies (e.g. Anis 
et al., 2016). 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics – company financial and market characteristics 
Total sample  
(Average, standard deviation in brackets) 
 
Data definition Variable Description Large CAP 
(FTSE 100) 
Mid CAP 
(FTSE 250) 
Small CAP 
(FTSE All 
share) 
Growth (GROW) Growth in sales %   7.627 
(50.969)
 5.779 
(722.583) 
 6.462 
(54.628)
Size (SIZE) Market Capitalisation 
(£m) 
28,297 
(31,519)
1,787 
(908) 
281 
(127)
Book to Market 
ratio (BM) 
Book equity divided by 
market capitalisation 
0.522 
(0.483)
0.626 
(0.597) 
0.820 
(0.750)
Standard 
deviation of stock 
returns (RISK) 
Standard deviation of  
daily stock returns 
 0.662 
(0.565)
 0.626 
(0.597) 
 0.491 
(0.358)
	
For our sub-samples of companies, the large CAP companies on average are more 
than 16 times larger market capitalisation than mid-CAP firms, which in turn are more 
than 6 times larger than small CAP firms.  In terms of market-data, the book to market 
ratio for small-CAP firms is relatively higher than for either mid-CAP or large CAP 
firms. By contrast, the standard deviation of stock returns for large-CAP firms is 
significantly higher than for either mid-CAP or small-CAP firms. These statistics 
imply that, for at least our sample of UK firms during the study period 2013-2015, 
firm size is negatively associated with both (a) the extent to which the market’s 
assessment of the extent to which current and future equity value (i.e. “intrinsic 
value”) is captured by past-oriented accounting book value, and (b) total firm risk. 
Consequently, more effective communication of risk management, risk culture and 
corporate strategy are likely to be particularly important to larger sized firms, in 
influencing the stock market’s relatively more negative assessment of both their total 
intrinsic value and firm risk. 
28 
 
 
4.4. Descriptive statistics – disclosure indices 
 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the FOG scores. These are reported separately 
for 2013 and 2014 comply within years and also separately in connection with both 
the disclosures in sections labelled “risk management” and “management strategy” 
(where relevant).17  
	 	
                                                 
17 Some companies were excluded from the FOG score analysis either because (a) the annual report 
was not amenable to software analysis, or (b) there was insufficient delineation of delineated risk 
management and/or management strategy sections within the annual report. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics – FOG indices 
Sample companies by market capitalisation 
(Averages, standard deviation in brackets) 
	
	
Sub-sample N Risk management section Management strategy 
section 
2013 2014 2013 2014 
Large Cap  19 20.57
(1.96)
23.17
(6.48)
19.78 
(3.14) 
19.96
(1.72)
Mid Cap 18 24.89
(12.38)
22.63
(9.99)
22.69 
(7.53) 
20.76
(5.02)
Small Cap  14 18.91
(2.18)
19.41
(2.28)
19.56 
(2.43) 
20.86
(2.87)
Total 51 20.71
(8.86)
21.92
(7.22)
20.61 
(4.87) 
19.97
(4.50)
	
	
Overall, Table 4 provides only equivocal evidence of improvement in the readability 
of the risk management and management strategy sections between the early  (2013) 
and late (2014) pre-implementation years related to the new corporate governance 
code disclosure requirements.  Moreover, these scores do not appear, at least in total, 
to support the stated policy objective of the revised Corporate Governance code to 
improve both the quality and consistency of UK corporate disclosures concerning 
firm risk and strategy. We also find more consistent trends over time across our entire 
sample in terms of disclosure consistency (i.e. as represented by the lower variations 
in overall score quality year on year) vis a vis the measured “quality” of disclosure 
(i.e. as represented by the magnitude change of the average FOG scores over time). 
Moreover, these trends are inconsistent in terms of both the type of score and firm 
size sub-samples. We briefly discuss below the major commonalities and trends. 
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In relation to the risk management related FOG scores, there is an overall, slight 
overall  increase in the FOG scores for the total sample over time, however this masks 
contrasting trends within the three sub-samples. Whereas for both the large and small 
CAP firm sub-samples, there is a small overall (but statistically insignificant) average 
improvement, there is a decline for the mid CAP sub-sample. By contrast, while the 
extent of variation in FOG scores for both the mid CAP and small CAP sub-samples 
reduces over time, it increases significantly for the large CAP sub-sample. This result 
implies there appears to be significant differences between our sub-samples in terms 
of the trade-off between improvements in overall “quality” in risk disclosures and 
their extent of variations in practices. 
 
By contrast, average “management strategy” FOG scores only improved over time for 
the small CAP sub-sample. There was no clear overall trend, with a slight decline in 
quality of scores for the mid CAP sub-sample and virtually no change for the large 
CAP sub-sample. The extent of variation in FOG scores declined over time for both 
the large CAP and mid CAP sub-samples, but slightly increased for the small CAP 
sub-sample. 
 
In summary, the overall FOG score trends present a confusing picture. There is no 
real consistent trend either in terms of overall quality and extent of variation in scores. 
Further detailed analysis of the self-constructed risk disclosure indices scores was also 
undertaken (not reported), decomposed by stage of risk assessment (see section 4.2). 
This analysis suggests that firms are relatively better at providing a narrative 
description of their principal risks, and of their monitoring processes of risk 
management systems (stages I and III) than in quantifying and analysing those risks 
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(stage II). These findings imply there are a number of opportunities for qualified 
professionals such as actuaries to engage with firms, in order to help them to further 
enhance both the quality and standardisation of their risk reporting practices. 
 
4.5. Risk Management Disclosure Index Score  
 
This section describes the major characteristics and trends in our three specifically 
constructed risk management disclosure index scores for Stages I-III, defined in Table 
2. The major features and trends (2013-2014) are discussed by comparing both 
industry sector (20 different firm-based levels, then aggregated into four sub-samples), 
as well as by market capitalization (FTSE 100 (large-CAP), FTSE 250 (mid-CAP) 
and FTSE all share (small Cap). for the two years 2013-2014. The major features of 
the scores are reported separately for each of the Stages I-III. 
 
4.5.1. Disclosure Index 
 
We first briefly outline the major trends in the components of the risk management 
disclosure index scores breakdown for each major component of stage I to III, further 
decomposed by market size sub-sample firms.  
  
Table 5 shows that business risk is the most significant component of stage I. There is 
some minor changes in the relative importance of some risk components across the 
three sus-samples, mainly in the business risk and operational risk components.  
However, there are no significant variations in any of the other Stage I risk 
components. 
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Table 5 
Component Breakdown of Average Stage I scores 
 Market Capitalisation Sub-sample (% of total score) 
 
Component  Large CAP  Mid CAP  Small CAP 
Market risk  13 13  12
Credit risk  12 14  15
Business risk  38 36  37
Liquidity risk  10 10  11
Operational risk  14 14  12
Strategy risk  8 8  8
Frictional risk  1 1  1
Aggregation risk  4 4  4
Total %  100 100  100
 
Table 6 shows the breakdown of stage II overall disclosure scores into the ten 
components, for each of the same three sub-samples of firms. These show that overall, 
the analysis of liquidity and credit risk are the most important analysis components, 
while non-quantified risks are the most salient component related to risk evaluation. 
There are few significant variations across the sub-samples.  
 
Table 6 
Component Breakdown of Average Stage II scores 
 Market Capitalisation Sub-sample (% of total score) 
 
Component  Large CAP  Mid CAP  Small CAP 
ERM  7 6  7
Risk analysis – market risk  7 10  7
Risk analysis – liquidity risk  14 14  14
Risk analysis – credit risk  16 14  16
Risk analysis – operational risk  5 7  5
Risk evaluation – market risk  10 10  10
Risk evaluation – liquidity risk  9 9  9
Risk evaluation – credit risk  3 1  3
Risk evaluation – operational risk  9 9  9
Risk evaluation – non‐quantified risks  20 20  20
Total  100 100  100
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Finally, table 7 shows the breakdown of stage II overall disclosure scores into the ten 
components related to board level monitoring and control procedures, again broken 
down by each of the same three sizes based firm sub-samples. These show that risk 
assessment, 3 lines of defence and whistleblowing are the most important components.  
By contrast, risk culture and risk appetite appear to be less significant, and slightly 
decrease in relative importance as firm size decreases. Again, there are few other 
significant variations across the three sub-samples.  
 
Table 7 
Component Breakdown of Average Stage III scores 
 Market Capitalisation Sub-sample (% of total score) 
 
Component  Large CAP  Mid CAP  Small CAP 
ERM and control process  10 9  10
Emerging risk  2 2  1
Incentives  11 11  10
Whistle‐blowers  14 14  15
Risk appetite  8 7  6
Risk controls  10 11  11
Board monitoring  14 15  16
Risk culture  2 1  0
Risk assessment  15 15  16
3 lines of defence  14 15  15
Total  100 100  100
 
Figures 1 and 2 provide summary variations in the total scores, in terms of market 
capitalisation and industry sector, respectively., The overall disclosure index score 
averages were highest for stage I and lowest for stage II (see figure 1).  However, 
stage I disclosures also exhibited the most significant variations between market 
capitalisation sub-samples. For example, stage I disclosure for FTSE 100 firms scored 
69.1% compared to 61.0% for FTSE All-Share firms. In addition, stage II two 
disclosures for FTSE All-Share firms were 28.4% compared to FTSE 100 at 35.6%. 
By contrast, stage III showed little variation across different firm sizes.  
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Figure 1 
Average Stage I-III Disclosure Score  
(By Firm Size – 2014) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows an analysis of the disclosure scores by broad industry sector. The 
financial sector received the top aggregate total disclosure score, whereas the services 
sector showed the lowest score. There was a minor increase for each sector for the 
period 2014 compared to 2013.  
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Figure 2 
Average Aggregate Total Disclosure across all firm sizes  
Comparative 2013-2014 
 
 
 
 
4.6. Reliability tests 
We follow the procedures established in prior relevant disclosure analysis literature 
(e.g. Anise et al., 2016) in conducting standard reliability checks on our disclosure 
scores. These include checks on the reliability of the keywords, reproducibility and 
accuracy.  
The reliability of most of the keywords was established by verification of their usage 
in Kelliher et al.'s (2013) actuarial classification system (Stage I), or the Revised 
Corporate Code and/or ISO 31000 (Stage II). Some of the categories used in Stage III 
were based on authorities such as well-known textbooks on enterprise risk 
management, such as Chapman (2008) or Sweeting (2014). 
 
Reproducibility refers to the degree to which a process can be replicated under 
different circumstances and using different coders (Krippendorff, 1980). The FOG 
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scores were based on the well-established WMMatrix software available at Lancaster 
University (https://cfie.lancaster.ac.uk:8443/). The specific risk management scoring 
measurement systems were constructed for Stage I to be directly comparable to those 
used in Klumpes et al. (2014), although the Stage II and Stage III scores are novel and 
therefore would not necessarily be reproducible. However for all scoring systems, 
scores were agreed for a sample of firms between the research assistant and one of the 
co-authors. 
 
Accuracy of the disclosure scores was assured by checking the accuracy of each word 
in every keywords list before considering it a keyword, by examining whether it really 
indicates what it is meant to do. Pearson correlation tests were also conducted to 
verify the degree of correlation (independence) between each of the three specific, 
manually coded risk management disclosure indices. We would expect a significant, 
positive correlation between the three indices but less than 70%. By contrast, we 
expect a lack of correlation between the computerised FOG scores related to the risk 
management and strategy sections of company annual reports.  
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5.	Empirical	Findings	
 
 
This section discusses the main patterns and cross-sectional variations among the 
sample of UK firms voluntarily complying with the new Corporate Code that we 
predict might explain the patterns of disclosure scores documented in the previous 
section. Empirical tests also provide a validity test of the explanatory power of our 
various alternative content-based disclosure indices described in the previous section. 
 
5.1. Determinants of early compliance 
The first analysis we conduct examines which perspective (economic or political 
visibility incentives) best explains the decision by firms to comply early with the new 
corporate governance code by our industry-matched sample of UK firms. This permits 
us to discriminate among the alternative perspectives discussed in section 2, i.e. is the 
timing of the compliance with the corporate governance codes related to a good news 
story, to inform the market about risks which were previously not disclosed, or a bad 
news story, i.e. to explain to the market the mismanagement of risks by firm 
management.  
 
We first pool the entire sample and then examine various patterns in behaviour 
of firms in terms of statistical variations in disclosure indices and the relevant 
financial characteristics defined in section 5 above. We then analyse whether firms 
comply with the specific new Corporate Code requirements identified in section 2. 
This is achieved by labelling and populating specific narrative sections related to 
“strategic risk management” and/or “risks”, and “our strategy” or “business strategy” 
during the transitional period 2013 (i.e. in the first full financial year after the revised 
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corporate code was issued in September 2013 but before its implementation date, 
effective in September 2015).  
 
Our first initial results are equivocal. In the case of the “viability statement” 
requirements of the revised code, we find that only one firm (British Aerospace) 
actually provided a statement in the form of a managerial narrative concerning its 
future prospects. By contrast, we find that 60% (31 firms) comply with the corporate 
code early through specified narrative sections in their “management” sections of the 
annual reports that address managerial policies in relation to “risk management” and 
“strategy”.18  
 
Following prior research (e.g. Anis et al., 2016); we then use the following OLS 
regression model to discriminate between alternative economic and political visibility 
explanations (discussed previously in section 3.1). This is proxied by the strength of 
statistical association between a disclosure index and various corporate and financial 
characteristics for any firm, i in our sample. 
DISit=i + 1SIZEi + 2RISKi + 3BMi + 4 COMPLYi + i    (1) 
 
Where DISit = disclosure quality for firm i at time t, as measured either using FOG 
scores for risk management and strategy sections, respectively, or risk management 
specific indices for Stages I, II and III, respectively; the explanatory variables are 
those defined in table 2. COMPLY is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm 
chose to voluntarily comply with the Corporate Governance Code requirements at 
                                                 
18 This is based on the analysis of narrative text contained in the management discussion section (and 
not the footnotes to the accounts which require mandatory disclosure of information in compliance 
with accounting standards). These findings are also limited to general principle recommendations of 
the Code, and do not refer to the compliance with separate, specific “viability statement” 
requirements of the code, discussed in section 6.1 below. 
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least a full financial year before the mandated implementation date, and  is the error 
term in the regression. Where the FOG index measurement software was unable to 
detect a specified section or discrete element of the annual report of a number of 
companies related to the generic topics "risk management" and/or "management 
strategy" or "our business strategy", COMPLY was coded as 0, 1 otherwise. This 
distinction is important because the absence of a specified "section" of the annual 
report therefore implies that the company did not actually comply with the implicit 
Revised Code requirements for statements concerning C2.2. (i.e. management 
expectations) and C2.3 (i.e. risk management).19   
 
Consistent with our predictions outlined in Section 3.1 above, any significant, positive 
association established between DISit and B2-B4 would support the “economic” 
rationale for early compliance with the revised code, while a positive relation between 
DISit and B1 would be supportive of an alternative “political visibility” explanation. 
 
Since the OLS regression analysis assumes independence of the variables, we need to 
ensure they are not highly correlated with each other.20 Table 8 shows the correlation 
analysis between the variables. Panel A (B) reports the correlation between the five 
measures of disclosure quality (firm characteristics). 
  
                                                 
19 As discussed below, the empirical results imply that "COMPLY" (a dummy variable coded either "1" 
(The software was able to detect a specific section in the annual report in each of these areas and thus 
provided a score) or "0" (no score was provided) seems to delineate "good" versus "bad" quality 
companies, at least in terms of the empirical proxies used for growth, size, and total firm risk. 
 
20 In order to avoid the limiting assumptions of OLS regression, as a robustness check, we alternatively 
run logistical regressions where COMPLY WITH is the dependent variable. 
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Table 8 
Correlation matrix  
 
 
SIZE GROW RISK BM COMPLY  
SIZE 1 
    
PROF 0.001 
    
ALTZ ‐0.145 
    
GROW 0.084 1 
   
RISK 0.176 ‐0.033 1 
  
BM 0.080 0.302** 0.075 1 
 
COMPLY 0.087 0.056 ‐0.135 0.122 1 
 
The correlations between independent variables are all low, except for the positive 
correlation between BM and GROW. This is to be expected since Book to Market is 
traditionally associated with growth opportunities.  
 
Table 9 reports the OLS regression results for the above specified linear model, where 
six different sets of models are shown depending on the choice of disclosure index. 
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Table 9 
OLS Regression Results 
Determinants of Risk Disclosure Quality 
(Coefficients, significance level in brackets) 
Variable 
SI SII SIII FOGRM FOGST 
Constant 
12.079 
(5.986)*** 
8.122 
(1.317) 
40.444
(9.168)*** 
13.514 
(2.128)** 
18.875*** 
(4.504) 
SIZE 
1.710 
(7.161)*** 
2.654 
(3.638)*** 
1.455 
(2.787)*** 
0.632 
(0.926) 
‐0.427 
(0.930) 
GROW 
‐0.016 
(1.900)* 
‐0.010 
(0.381) 
‐0.044 
(2.363)** 
0.018 
(0.766) 
‐0.014 
(0.892) 
RISK 
1.629 
(2.081)** 4.941(2.066)*
* 
0.803 
(0.469) 
‐ 1.438 
(0.645) 
 ‐0.494 
(0.271) 
BM 
‐0.453 
(0.660) 
3.507 
(1.673)* 
2.736 
(1.824)* 
6.683 
(3.166)*** 
1.499 
(0.967) 
COMPLY 
2.443 
(2.878)*** 
1.391 
(0.536) 
4.119 
(2.220)** 
‐0.899 
(0.362) 
 4.385 
(2.385)** 
Adj R‐sq 0.509 0.212 0.248 0.145 0.105 
Model F 13.254*** 4.177*** 4.884*** 2. 561** 1.981* 
 
The overall F-statistic for all six OLS regressions are statistically significant at least at 
the 5% level, implying that the model specified in equation (1) explains cross-
sectional variations across the pooled sample.  
The propensity to comply with the corporate code disclosures early (COMPLY) is 
positively associated with disclosure quality measures for all models except for the 
FOG-based risk management model, and are statistically significant at least at the 10% 
level, except for the Stage II model.  
By contrast, there is a negative, but not statistically significant, association between 
FOG-based risk management disclosure measure and the propensity to comply with 
the Corporate Governance Code reporting requirements. This is consistent with an 
adverse selection argument which implies those firms with relatively greater risk 
management-based disclosures are less likely to comply with the Code. 
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For each of the three specific indices, SIZE is positive and significant at the 10% level, 
implying that political visibility, rather than pure economic rationales for early 
compliance, may be underlying the results. However, both RISK and BM are also 
positively associated with disclosure quality for stage II and III (and combined score) 
regressions, implying that relatively more risky and future value-oriented firms are 
likely to disclose more information about their risk measurement and monitoring 
processes and procedures, respectively.. 
 
The OLS regression model results are more equivocal for the two FOG score based 
disclosure indices. GROW is positively and statistically significantly related to 
disclosures related to risk management. By contrast, it is negatively and statistically 
related to disclosures related to management strategy. These results seem intuitively 
plausible if we accept an adverse selection-based economic story that the extent of a 
firm’s future prospects is positively and negatively related to the extent of their 
elaboration of risk management and corporate strategy, respectively. However except 
for BM, none of the other variables are statistically significant for any of these models.  
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6.	Best	Practice	Examples	
 
In this section, we briefly highlight the outliers in terms of good and poor practices as 
revealed by the three specific risk management disclosure indices stages I-III for the 
two years. We then provide a qualitative assessment derived from reading a small 
sample of report and accounts and we highlight some examples of good practice 
disclosure we have seen. 
 
6.1. Outliers 
Table 10 shows the highest and lowest scoring industry sectors within each category 
of market capitalisation for the 2013 financial year. The financial sector comprises 
three industries; banking, insurance and life insurance which are subject to stringent 
disclosure regulations. Consequently, this sector shows the highest average scores in 
each of the three stages and across all company sizes except at stage one for FTSE 
100 which was led by the oil & gas industry. In contrast, the transport industry 
(categorised as part of the “other” sector), received the lowest scores at all stages 
across most firm sizes. Although, we would generally expect to witness higher 
disclosure scores for FTSE 100 firms than FTSE 250 or FTSE All-Share, the results 
showed variation across different industries. For instance, the banking industry 
showed higher disclosure scores for larger firms (FTSE 100) while the software and 
support industry showed lower disclosure scores for larger firms. The services sector 
poor disclosure score stems from its low scoring firms in software and support and 
travel and leisure. 
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Table 10 
Sector Outliers by Disclosure Stage & Market Capitalisation 2013 
 
 FTSE100 FTSE 250 FTSE All Share 
Stage 1 Industry Industry Industry 
Min Transport Personal Good Transport 
Max Oil & Gas Life Insurance Life Insurance 
Stage 2 Industry Industry Industry 
Min Software & Support Software & Support Transport 
Max Banking Banking Life Insurance 
Stage 3 Industry Industry Industry 
Min Travel and Leisure Communications Transport 
Max Banking Life insurance Life Insurance 
 
Table 11 shows the highest and lowest scoring industry sectors within each category 
of market capitalisation for 2014. There are a small number of changes from 2013 but 
the overall picture presented is very similar to 2014. 
 
Table 11 
Sector Outliers by Disclosure Stage & Market Capitalisation 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2. Commentary and Discussion 
 
Stage I 
 FTSE100 FTSE 250 FTSE All Share 
Stage 1 Industry Industry Industry 
Min Transport Personal Good Transport 
Max Pharmaceutical Life Insurance Life Insurance 
Stage 2 Industry Industry Industry 
Min Software & Support Software & Support Transport 
Max Banking Banking Life Insurance 
Stage 3 Industry Industry Industry 
Min Travel and Leisure Industrial Engineering Utilities 
Max Life Insurance Life insurance Construction and 
Materials 
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The results of the qualitative analysis of company disclosures are consistent with the 
disclosure index results. We generally found that very high or very low disclosure 
index scores were corroborated by a review of the corresponding reports. 
We noted that certain issues facing a company may lead to significantly increased 
levels of reporting such as for BP plc in 2013. 
 
An example of good practice disclosure of principal risks was noted in the Chesnara 
FY14 year-end accounts: 
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Stage II 
 
The results of the qualitative analysis of company disclosures are again consistent 
with the disclosure index results. It was noted that HSBC appears to demonstrate good 
examples of the analysis and disclosure of key risks, consistent with the findings for 
stage 2, for example, measuring targets versus actual level. There was a notable 
improvement in Sage accounts between 2013 and 2014, in particular around the 
disclosure of risk appetite, severity of risk exposure and commentary on whether risks 
have increased or decreased over the financial period. By contrast for medium CAP 
firms there seems to be more emphasis on qualitative disclosure and less on precision 
of measures used. For small CAP firms industry sector appears to have a significant 
impact with the insurance sector (Chesnara) providing significantly more quantum 
and quality of disclosure than the minimum as illustrated by the transport sector. 
There does not seem to be a significant variation between average firms in this sector 
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and “outlier high quality firms” and there are relatively few examples seen of 
good/excellent practice.   
 
Stage III 
 
The results of the qualitative analysis of company disclosures are again consistent 
with the disclosure index results. It is apparent that regulated, risk-oriented financial 
firms such as HSBC provide a significantly greater level of detail and disclosure on 
key components of their risk management framework than do unregulated non-
financial firms. The HSBC 2014 accounts include a chart clearly defining the Risk 
Management Framework as well as details on sustainability of this framework. 
On the other hand non-financial firms present a much more myopic view of risk 
management with a focus on simple control related or operational risk aspects of risk 
management. Most of the discussion is kept at the strategic level and lacks 
specification and sophistication. There is a distinct lack of recognition of the role that 
issues like risk culture or risk appetite have in the design of effective management 
control and monitoring systems. 
HSBC was an example from 2014 of good practice disclosures with an extract 
presented below: 
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6.3. Commentary Published by the Professional Firms 
 
A number of the professional firms have released publications providing a detailed 
analysis of all aspects of company report and accounts and have included discussion 
of the readiness of UK firms to adopt the revised Code. Our aim in this paper is not to 
replicate the content of these publications but to hopefully provide an alternative 
perspective through the analysis methodologies presented in the earlier sections of 
this paper. 
 
Deloitte reported “52% of the companies surveyed referred to changes that would be 
necessary to adopt the 2014 Code, but only a handful had early-adopted any of the 
new provisions. One company noted that they had done so in relation to the new 
requirements around directors’ remuneration. Another included a viability statement.” 
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7.	Conclusion	
 
This paper provides important new insights on incentives facing UK firms to 
voluntarily comply with new Corporate Code requirements related to risk assessment, 
monitoring and viability statements.  
 
When we look at our results in their entirety, we believe that we have found several 
pieces of evidence supporting the political visibility explanation of early compliance 
with the new Corporate Code requirements, at least related to principal risk 
assessments and review processes.  By contrast, there is little evidence that our 
sample firms have chosen to provide a viability statement. Further, it seems that the 
propensity to produce specified risk management and “management strategy” 
elements of the strategic report are more closely related with standard economic 
(adverse selection) or “good news” rationales. 
 
The extent of our inferences from the empirical analysis reported in section 5 is 
subject to standard econometric analysis limitations associated with the sample size, 
errors in measurement variables and distributional assumptions underlying the 
parametric tests conducted. Thus our results should be treated with caution at this 
point. 
 
Subject to these caveats, our results imply that political visibility is the primary 
motivation behind management incentives to comply early with the revised code 
requirements relating to assessment of principal risks and monitoring mechanisms. 
However by contrast, there seem little incentives facing most of our sample to 
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produce a viability statement, suggesting that an alternative “adverse selection” -
economic argument.  
 
Further research is warranted in a number of directions. First, further clarification is 
needed of the validity of the various “readability indices” constructed and applied in 
the analysis as proxies for disclosure quality. Second, our analysis of the New Code 
requirements was restricted to those likely to be of most interest to risk professionals 
(i.e. identification of principal risks, monitoring processes of risk management 
systems and quantification and analysis of risks). However the Revised code also 
contains important new requirements concerning alignment of managerial 
remuneration policies with the long term sustained creation of value. Therefore we 
did not study the impact of corporate governance quality measures such as the number 
of independent directors, managerial bonuses and/or options, ownership concentration 
or audit and/or non-audit professional fees paid to intermediaries. Such variables may 
also be of relevance to the evolving role of risk professional “gatekeepers” in 
affecting discretionary disclosure policies in the Strategic Report element of UK 
corporate annual reports. Moreover, there appears to be a significant level of overlap 
between the “strategic report” requirements of the revised code and the separately 
developed global “integrated reporting” protocols related to sustainability reporting. 
Further research is needed to clarify these issues 
 
Finally, as noted in the paper, the disclosures we have analysed have not yet fully 
adopted the provisions of the 2014 Corporate Governance Code so we can expect 
material changes to subsequent reports that would merit further analysis. 
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8.	Implications	for	Actuaries	
 
The changes to the 2014 Corporate Governance Code and the associated guidelines 
represent a significant stepping up of the expectations being placed on corporate risk 
reporting. There is increased focus on the quantification and modelling of risk and the 
new viability statement requirement will require firms to model outcomes for their 
business under a range of different scenarios. 
 
These are areas where actuaries could make a particularly valuable contribution. They 
bring strong modelling capabilities and risk management expertise underpinned by a 
robust professional and ethical framework. Actuaries have experience of modelling 
future outcomes for insurance companies and pension funds. Solvency II regulations 
mean that insurers have implemented the most advanced risk management processes. 
The research tends to support the view that the financial sector is ahead of many other 
sectors in their risk reporting practices. This all suggests an excellent opportunity 
exists for the profession. 
 
Other elements of our findings are however less encouraging. They suggest that firms 
may only implement change when they need to in order to comply with regulations. 
Their focus may purely be on meeting market expectations in relation to compliance 
rather than being driven by a strong belief in the value to be gained from enhancing 
their risk management processes. If this is the case then it may be difficult for 
actuaries to persuade firms that their skills are worth paying for.  
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2015 report and accounts will soon be available for analysis and it will then be 
possible to study how firms have chosen to comply with the requirements. There is 
the potential for firms to give investors and other stakeholders a much richer 
understanding of how they will perform under a range of different future scenarios. 
Alternatively firms may choose to offer the minimum level of disclosure to tick a 
compliance box. The authors would encourage the IFoA to consider further research 
to develop an understanding of the links between business performance and the 
quality of risk reporting. For actuaries to extend their influence in wider business 
sectors they will need to demonstrate the value that their skills can add. 
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